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Disruptive Sharing in a Digital Age: 
Rejecting Neoliberalism? 
 
Bart Cammaerts 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Some argue that neoliberalism can be seen as having negated its negation, socialism 
and communism, and become unquestionable and commonsense. However, many 
practices from below resist, reject or at least disrupt the stringent property rights 
regime and the primacy of the market, two core elements of neoliberal ideology. 
Some of these practices of resistance are in the form of a disruption to or rejection of 
the commodity exchange model. In this article we address three modes of sharing in 
a digital context, embedded in a cultural exchange model – sharing code, sharing 
content and sharing access. These different practices of giving and sharing are 
analyzed according to the way reciprocity is articulated, the extent to which they 
disrupt the capitalist model of commodity exchange, and the ways in which they 
interact or not with it. We conclude that all forms of digital sharing involve degrees of 
reciprocity, and that all sharing in digital contexts is gradually appropriated by 
capitalist logics, mainly through the creation of auxiliary revenues. Many sharing 
practices do not intend to reject or disrupt, so, while some sharing practices might 
constitute a (partial) disruption to the commodity exchange model, they may not 
necessarily result in its negation. Recent attempts by states and parts of the 
entertainment industry to discipline or coerce the revivified participatory culture and 
its cultural exchange ethic, to fit the commodity exchange model raises serious 
concerns.  
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Word count: 8019 (refs and notes included) 
 
  2 
Disruptive Sharing in a Digital Age: 
Rejecting Neoliberalism? 
 
 
‘every pleasure which emancipates itself from exchange-value takes on subversive features’ 
(Adorno 2002 [1938], 297) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Whilst the state and social democracy were once considered to be corrective and 
safeguards against the crude and individualistic whims of the market, they now very 
much embody and personify neoliberal values and core principles. Harvey (2005) 
opposes the social democratic state, promoting the well-being of all citizens, full 
employment and the redistribution of wealth to the contemporary neoliberal state, 
whose remit is reduced to maximizing the conditions for capital accumulation and 
defending property rights, business interests and the primacy of the market.  
 
Žižek (2008, 189) argues that the reformist left – in Europe as well as in the US – by 
adopting the third-way ideology, has consolidated the neoliberal revolution that was 
led by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s: ‘Thatcher was not a Thatcherite, she was 
just herself – it was Blair (more than John Major) who truly forged Thatcherism as a 
notion’. Drawing on Hegel, Žižek calls this an example of the negation of the 
negation, ‘a victory in defeat: it occurs when one’s specific message is accepted as a 
universal framework, even by the enemy’ (ibid), turning contingency into necessity. 
Even after the deep systemic crisis in the deregulated financial system and the 
subsequent massive bailout by tax-payers and states this sublation has allowed the 
neoliberal paradigm and ideology to position itself as unquestionable, as a synthesis, 
an absolute – hence the signaling ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992) or claims that 
left and right no longer exist. In other words, neoliberalism, as an ideology and as a 
practice, has managed to negate its negation, namely socialism and communism.  
 
This ties in with the Gramscian notion of hegemony, a manufactured consensus, a 
collective will, involving a struggle for ‘moral, cultural, intellectual and, thereby, 
political leadership over the whole society’ (Bennett, Mercer and Woollacott 1986, 
xiv). Despite this, history teaches that hegemony is ‘a mode of control that has to be 
fought for constantly in order to maintain it’ (Giroux 1981, 17); as such, it can never 
be ultimately fixed or made permanently self-evident (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 111).  
 
Since the neoliberal state and its democratic institutions have become caught up in 
the protection of corporate and other elite interests, many alternatives that challenge 
the capitalist paradigm are being developed bottom-up, through the establishment of 
temporary autonomous or at times even illicit zones, and through the displacement 
of commodity exchange by a culture of giving and sharing (Bey 1991/2003). While 
there seems to be no convincing alternative grand narrative capable of challenging 
neoliberalism, in the everyday lives of activists, citizens and even consumers we 
observe an abundance of micro practices that reject and/or deterritorialize the 
arbolic capitalist structures, some of which constitute serious threats from the micro 
to the macro (Deleuze and Guatari 1987).  
 
Three such disruptive practices centered on the digital culture of sharing are 
addressed here: 1) sharing of code, 2) sharing of digital content and 3) sharing of 
access. All these practices involve forms of giving and receiving, which inevitably 
implicates theories of traditional gift economies. In his classic anthropological study 
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The Gift, Mauss (1950 [2005]) stresses the centrality of reciprocity in relation to the 
act of giving and refutes the idea that the act of giving is ever without strings.  
 
Analysis of these three forms of sharing in a digital context highlights the ways in 
which reciprocity is articulated, the extent to which these different practices of giving 
and sharing disrupt the capitalist logic of commodity exchange, and the ways in 
which they interact with it or not. First we juxtapose different approaches to giving 
and sharing in the material world to these actions in an immaterial digital context.  
 
2. Giving and sharing in the mediated age 
 
In theories of traditional gift economies, power and symbolic capital play pivotal 
roles in the dialectic between giving and receiving. Some individuals are in a position 
to give more than others and, as Mauss (1950 [2005], 83) points out, ‘[c]harity is still 
wounding for him who has accepted it’. As a result, receiving in a material world 
often leads to the reinforcement of social relations, the cementing of social 
dependencies and the reproduction of the existing power relations.  
 
This intrinsic linking of the gift to the obligation to reciprocate, and the emphasis on 
the two-dimensional power relationship between giver and receiver highlighted by 
Mauss, has been challenged by several authors. Hyde (1979 [1983]), for example, 
differentiates between true and false gifts: the former is given out of gratitude and the 
latter out of obligation. Cheal (1988) positions the act of giving in relation to 
friendship, love, strong ties and dependencies. Thus, these authors disassociate the 
act of giving from the need for reciprocity by stressing a belief in genuine generosity 
and altruism as the basis of giving.  
 
Others find this problematic and try to articulate a distinction from the traditional 
gift economy, rife with the issues of reciprocity, power and the culture of sharing, to a 
situation less conditioned by the need for reciprocity. Sharing inevitably involves 
giving and receiving, but, according to Belk (2007, 127), it can be positioned as the 
absolute antipode of commodity exchange and involves no expectation of reciprocity. 
Belk proposes a continuum where ‘commodity exchange lies at one end and sharing 
at the other, with gift giving somewhere in the middle’. Belk (2007, 128) goes on to 
connect commodity exchange with egoism, stinginess and impersonality, while 
identifying genuine altruism, generosity and personality as core characteristics of 
ideal-type sharing. Gift economies, then, combine aspects of both ends of the 
continuum and therefore, as pointed out above, are more ambiguous.  
 
Sharing in the material world is seen as a highly interpersonal process, self evident, 
unquestioned rather than ritualized and contested as in the case of a gift. This 
difference is exposed linguistically through the use of the words receiving/accepting 
a gift and taking something that is being shared. Considering giving and sharing in a 
digital environment opens up an array of new opportunities in terms of fostering a 
culture of giving and sharing. Kollock (1999, 223) argues that many of the problems 
associated with giving and receiving in offline communities, can be overcome in 
online communities. He argues that the emergence of digital technologies and the 
internet has greatly reduced the costs associated with giving and sharing, and the 
scale of sharing has no consequences for its cost.  
 
However, the nature of what is being shared – immaterial goods - is undoubtedly as 
important as the technology that enables its sharing. Digital immaterial goods are a 
potent illustration of what Mandel (1975) calls ‘total automation’ in pointing to the 
possibility to reproduce something infinitely without generating additional labour 
costs. This potential of infinite digital reproduction enables a reconnection with older 
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forms of cultural exchange; it transforms the digitized content into something like 
speech, and as we know ‘[t]he model of consumption does not fit practices of speech 
or singing’ (Poster 2004, 417).  
 
Also, sharing in a mediated and digital space as opposed to in the material world, is 
fed by the collective strength of (often very) weak ties in densely networked 
environments; it somehow links individual action and gain to collectivism without 
which the individual would gain nothing. Despite this, the existence of strong ties 
remains a quintessential condition for some particular forms of digital sharing 
requiring trust and/or expertise. Thus, ties in relation to giving and sharing in a 
digital environment are perhaps not so different from giving and sharing ties in 
everyday life. As Haythornthwaite (2002, 387) reminds us: 
 
… ties of various strengths, with their different ranges and access to resources, fill 
important niches in our daily work and lives. The dual usefulness of strong and weak 
ties begins to provide some explanation for the impacts of new media. 
 
This parallel between the offline and online in terms of ties, holds also in relation to 
the online reproduction of power-relations prevalent in the offline. For example, as 
argued elsewhere, web 2.0 has been almost fully appropriated and integrated in the 
capitalist hegemony (Cammaerts 2008).  
 
Both state and market actors may attempt to appropriate or co-opt disruptive 
practices or use repression to stop them completely. Some forms of sharing are more 
vulnerable than others to the tactics of co-option and repression. At the same time, 
these interventions of state and market on disruptive practices of sharing are not 
necessarily detrimental and potentially might be productive.  
 
Three modes of disruptive sharing in digital environments are developed here – 
sharing code, sharing digital content, and sharing access1, Each is disruptive in some 
way, but also exhibits strategies of co-option by capitalist interests.  
 
3. Disruptive Sharing Practices  
 
‘Information wants to be free’ was one of the most pervasive phrases invoked by the 
early hacker movement, highlighting its ethics of open access to information and 
(technical) knowledge. However, the second phrase – ‘Information also wants to be 
expensive’ (Brand 1987, 202) – is often forgotten. In essence, we are confronted by a 
permanent tension and conflict between open access and exclusivity, between 
cultural exchange and commodity exchange, which is in line with well-known 
capitalist strategies of constantly attempting to create scarcity. At the same time, 
there are those who take a more normative stance saying that ‘information ought to 
be free’, and viewing information and knowledge as more than a mere product or 
tradable commodity. Such advocates of the public domain argue that ‘different 
principles should govern the creation of property rights in information’ (Mansell and 
Steinmueller 2002, 298). 
 
The three modes of disruptive sharing addressed here are related, therefore, to a 
more fundamental debate around the sharing of and access to information and 
human knowledge, and the longstanding legacy in the sciences of a cultural exchange 
model. Similarly, culture has a long tradition of sharing geared towards diffusing 
ideas, songs, stories, which, above all, take place outside of the value-chain (Jenkins 
2003). 
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Rejecting the commodity transaction model in terms of access to information and 
knowledge, and foregrounding a cultural exchange model, however, is not so 
straightforward. Mansell and Steinmueller (2002) point to the legal constraints: 
copyright and patent laws are fairly ubiquitous for newly produced content, and laws 
tend to dutifully protect the property regime. The authors also identify an opening for 
market actors to embrace the cultural exchange model by generating indirect or 
auxiliary revenues.  
 
The first two modes of disruptive sharing – of code and digital content – to some 
extent defy the logic of commodity exchange, of private property, prevalent in the 
material world. In so doing they counter a propriety culture with a participatory 
culture marked by distinct cultural exchange models. However, this is not to imply 
that the market is absent, since the facilitation of these participatory practices or the 
distribution of the free good become ways of generating indirect revenues through 
subscriptions, premiums, service contracts or online advertising.   
 
Perhaps paradoxically, we address sharing access to the internet as an infrastructure 
last, although in many ways it can be seen as the pre-condition for having access to 
open source software and networks, and to digital content, propriety or not. 
However, in this paper, access to the infrastructure is approached not merely in 
terms of extending the possibilities for sharing of information and knowledge in the 
form of digital code and digital content, but also as a vulnerability, a locus that can 
disrupt the disruptions which the sharing of code and of content represent. 
 
Sharing code  
 
The conflict between the hacking culture of early computing and programming and 
the propriety software industry erupted at a very early stage. It was Bill Gates who 
first accused the computer hobbyist community of theft and parasitic behavior in an 
open letter to the Homebrew Computer Club Newsletter. 
 
As the majority of hobbyists must be aware, most of you steal your software. 
Hardware must be paid for, but software is something to share. Who cares if the 
people who worked on it get paid? […] One thing you do do is prevent good software 
from being written. Who can afford to do professional work for nothing? (Gates 1976, 
2) 
 
The Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS) movement has proven Gates to 
be wrong. Much free software has turned out to be more stable and less plagued by 
bugs than comparable commercial products developed by companies such as Gates’s 
Microsoft. The FLOSS movement has been and continues to be a robust competitor 
to propriety software development at the global level.  
 
About 67% of the 1 million busiest websites worldwide run on Apache open source 
operating systems, while Microsoft’s share of server-market is a mere 17% (Netcraft 
2010). Many companies have introduced open source software to reduce costs. For 
example, since 2001, the online bookseller Amazon has run entirely on the Linux OS, 
which has reduced its operating costs by about 25% (Shankland, Kane and Lemos 
2001). Many universities and university libraries worldwide have adopted open 
source software solutions for databases, catalogues, intranets and teaching platforms. 
And in the developing world, many public institutions in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa have migrated to open source software and are actively supporting open source 
software development (Câmara and Fonseca 2007).  
 
In 1989 Richard Stallman developed the General Public License (GPL) to suit the 
particular needs of the then burgeoning Free Software Movement. A Copyleft license, 
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as these came to be known, uses ‘copyright law, but flips it over to serve the opposite 
purpose’ (Stallman 1999, 59). Information is not just placed in the public domain; 
copyright law ensures that it remains public.  
 
As a reaction to the radical GPL protection of the public domain from commercial 
exploitation and commodification, other more flexible licenses were introduced, 
which were more accommodating to market needs and, thus, opened the door to 
appropriation. These ‘open source’ - rather than free - public licenses impose fewer 
restrictions on what the commercial user can do with the material. Open source 
licenses are seen as being more business friendly precisely because, while they often 
allow redistribution under GLP, they do not always require it (Söderberg 2002). This 
is the reason there is some degree of propriety code embedded in most popular open 
source software programs.  
 
Open source licenses have enabled parts of the corporate sector to support and invest 
in open source software development. Examples are endorsement of the FLOSS 
movement by IBM and Intel, among others, and successful open source companies 
such as Red Hat and Cygnus, along with the increased use of open source software in 
the private sector. Many companies have become highly profitable by providing 
auxiliary services geared towards open source software, such as customizing certain 
platforms or databases, packaging, installation or fixing problems. Co-option of the 
FOSS movement and parts of its ethics by corporate actors and interests, is not in 
itself necessarily bad. According to Söderberg (2007, 36), ‘activists should not forget 
that the pragmatic attitude of hackers towards commercial involvement partly 
explains their stunning success’.  
 
The growing involvement in the FLOSS movement of the corporate sector raises 
areas of contention related to labor, remuneration and coders’ personal motivations 
for sharing their labor in collective and collaborative projects (Terranova 2000; 
Lancashire 2001 [2005]; Benkler 2006; Söderberg 2007). Achievement of social and 
symbolic capital –reputation and recognition within the movement – is often a 
powerful motive for coders to engage in open source projects. Collaboration and 
active contribution to an open source project can strengthen the software 
programmer’s CV or improve access to venture capital (Weber 2000, 25). Some 
software companies allocate time for their programmers to work in collaborative 
open source projects to speed up their problem solving. Altruism, therefore, is not the 
only motivation of FLOSS developers. As Berguist and Ljungberg (2001, 313) point 
out: 
 
giving digital gifts does not remove the interdependencies between givers and 
receivers. But social relationships and obligations between the parties involved in the 
exchange are restructured based on the character of digital information and the 
Internet as a social world. 
 
The FLOSS movement clearly has benefited societies by developing free software and 
making it accessible to a global public, and by devising a legal mechanism to keep 
free content firmly in the public domain. The disruptive impact of the FLOSS 
movement remains significant, but has been mostly neutralized by corporate actors. 
Also, the FLOSS movement operates within the copyright regime, even though it 
perverts it to protect the public domain. In the discussion on sharing digital content 
we show how the copyright regime is firmly rejected. One of the founders of The 
Pirate Bay describes it not as copyleft but as copyriot (Fleischer 2008).  
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Sharing digital content 
 
As mentioned earlier, the sharing of cultural content and scientific knowledge is not a 
new phenomenon; it was quintessential to human development and advancement in 
pre-industrial societies. In industrial and post-industrial society several technologies 
and their potential to reproduce poetry, literature, paintings, music and later films, 
have contributed to the commodification of culture and increased the possibilities for 
sharing culture. With the emergence of digitalization, however, the scale of sharing 
changed radically. While pre-digitalization, the sharing of cultural content often 
occurred between strong peers, digitalization means it takes place in a context of 
(very) weak ties and on a global scale. 
 
It is not only the scope of sharing that has increased exponentially as a result of 
digitalization, but also the breadth of what is available online. Advanced compression 
techniques, the emergence of decentralized peer-to-peer interfaces, encryption and 
specialist blogs linked to massive filesharing sites, have led to a situation where 
almost any digital ‘product’ – whether propriety software, music, e-books, magazines, 
films, TV shows and even live sport broadcasts - can be found, watched, read, listened 
to, shared and copied globally.  
 
Two types of sharing of digital content can be differentiated. Decentralized peer-to-
peer filesharing refers to anonymous ‘peers’, who share digital content, computer to 
computer, mediated by a bit-torrent protocol rather than a central server. This 
phenomenon has facilitated ‘the easy spread of content in a way unimagined a 
generation ago’ (Lessig 2004, 17). With this type of filesharing, whenever you are 
downloading you are simultaneously uploading, which makes taking, in a peer-to-
peer context, inescapably altruistic whilst also being individualistic. This type of 
sharing has proven difficult to co-opt or repress due to its global and fragmented 
nature and, therefore, represents one of the greatest challenges for the neoliberal 
property rights regime.  
 
The second form of filesharing occurs through commercial filesharing sites, which 
enable bloggers, aggregators and crackers to upload large (encrypted) files and/or 
make links to the content accessible to those who follow a particular blog, or enable 
the streaming of live TV broadcasts. Bloggers receive kudos for their labours to make 
accessible what is often obscure content, that is difficult to get hold of in the material 
world. They are seen by some as performing the activity of archiving and enriching 
the public domain (Bruns 2010). Filesharing sites popular with bloggers and 
aggregators, such as RapidShare, FileServe or Hotfile, operate premium services and 
both music and software blogs as well as the filesharing sites often host quite 
aggressive online advertising. Websites, such as V-Share, Livestream, Justin TV or 
Ustream, facilitate the streaming of live TV and, again, host excessive online 
advertising and offer premium services. 
 
Nevertheless, the practice of sharing digital content online, in combination with total 
automation, in many ways rejects the current copyright regime, which is enmeshed in 
(intellectual) property rights – one of the cornerstone of the neoliberal paradigm. 
Steinmueller (2008, 17) in this context refers to the ‘copyright-crisis era’. This 
explains the current heavy handedness of the entertainment industries in trying to 
discipline the sharing of digital content online through repression and scare tactics, 
and also through lobbying governments to adopt ever more stringent and intrusive 
legislation (Alliance Against IP Theft 2008; RIAA 2009).  
 
In the context of the music industry, lobby organizations claim that labels and their 
artists lost more than US$ 40 bn in revenue in 2008 due to piracy and what they 
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consider illicit downloads (IFPI 2009: 22). They argue also that the total disregard of 
the consumer for the rights of copyright holders and creators not only causes serious 
damage to the music and entertainment industry, but ultimately will be detrimental 
to the diversity of cultural and creative production. Econometrics scholars, such as 
Zentner (2006) and Liebowitz (2006), support these arguments with empirical data; 
others reject these claims pointing to evidence that contradicts these gloomy 
projections, differentiating between activities within and sub-sections of the music 
industry and between different types of downloaders (Molteni and Ordanini 2003; 
Rob and Waldfogel 2006; Oberholzer and Strumpf 2007; Bhattacharjee, et al. 2007).  
 
While it is generally accepted that projections of the losses due to peer-to-peer 
sharing of music are greatly exaggerated by lobby organizations, mainly because it is 
not realistic to assume that all the cultural products downloaded would otherwise 
have been purchased (Liebowitz 2006, 13), it is undeniable that the music industry 
generally, is struggling. While revenues for legal downloads may have soared2, this 
does not compensate for lost sales of more highly priced CDs. It is debatable, 
however, whether this crisis is attributable to filesharing as such, or whether some 
broader societal causes need also to be taken into account. As Leyshon, et al. (2006, 
181) argue:  
 
[T]he problems facing the music industry have not suddenly been manifested 
overnight, or even in response to on-line digital file exchange, but rather have 
accumulated over time in response to a set of broader cultural forces that have 
changed the role of music within society, and relegated its immediacy and importance 
among many of its consumers. 
 
Music in the form of a digital file turns into something ‘ephemeral, its duration 
becomes compressed, and it becomes more of a process than a finished product’ 
(Terranova 2000, 48), which can be seen as reconnecting with a more traditional 
form of enjoying and sharing culture. The ubiquity of music in everyday life, the 
massive increase in releases catering to a multiplicity of genres and sub-genres, and 
limits on families’ entertainment budgets, are all contributing to changing attitudes 
to music and its consumption. Furthermore, most filesharers although aware that 
their behavior constitutes an infringement, do not perceive it as morally wrong 
(Hietanen, Huttunen and Kokkinen 2008). 
 
From the perspective of audiences or rather copyright users, it should be 
acknowledged also that digital filesharing has enabled many people to discover and 
to explore music, and have much more extensive and eclectic music collections than 
they could have afforded to buy. Thus, Oberholzer and Strumpf (2007, 40) conclude 
that ‘[t]he sheer magnitude of P2P activity, the billions of songs downloaded each 
year, suggests that the added social welfare from filesharing is likely to be high’. 
Similarly, Currah (2006, 443) points out that filesharing has ‘facilitated much greater 
user participation in what had previously been an arcane “gift economy” dominated 
by enthusiasts and hobbyists’.  
 
More and more artists and music labels are embracing and making full use of the file-
sharing logic (Williamson and Cloonan 2007). It has enable (some) artists to develop 
direct relationships with their fans exploiting a revivified and vibrant participatory 
culture. Positive exposure, in the form of brand recognition, notoriety and fame, 
which draw audiences to concerts, is important, but so also is the so-called sampling 
effect of people buying music discovered through downloading (Oberholzer and 
Strumpf 2007: 38). The revenues from live performances increasingly are shared 
between artist and record label; many labels act as booking agents for their artists, 
and the proceeds flow back into new releases (Webb 2007). Some labels have 
developed innovative models of publishing music exclusively online under creative 
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commons licenses and accepting donations; a good example here is the Sheffield 
netlabel Planet Terror Records3, but there are many others.  
 
As with the case of the FLOSS movement, sharing digital content presents a mixed 
and confused picture. Because of its success and ease, but also because of its partial 
rejection of the property and commodity exchange regime, the sharing of immaterial 
digital content is one of the most disruptive forms of sharing. The gift economy of 
online file sharing is rife with implicit and explicit reciprocities. Peer-to-peer 
networks employ a form of enforced reciprocity, while commercial filesharing sites 
feed off the altruistic practices of aggregators, bloggers and hackers who invest much 
time and energy into recording, transferring, uploading, archiving and converting 
digital content for others to enjoy for free. Specialist bloggers can obtain kudos and 
accumulate social capital from their micro-audiences.  
 
At the same time, tension is rising between what Jenkins (2003) called the 
participatory culture, which reconnects with older forms of cultural diffusion and the 
persistent efforts of states and lobby organizations to close loopholes and criminalize 
or repress certain practices that are an inherent part of this participatory culture. 
Recent regulatory initiatives in the UK and other countries to counter filesharing by 
monitoring online behaviour and penalizing offenders have serious implications for 
privacy online and for the information and communication rights of citizens 
(Banerjee, et al. 2008). They are also likely to be detrimental to the revitalization of 
the participatory culture and the innovation it represents. Also these initiatives are 
likely to fuel the ongoing turf war between the industry and hackers by bypassing 
technical means of protection and detection (Collins and Mansell 2005).  
 
Sharing Access 
 
Access to internet infrastructures has always been high on the policy agenda. 
However, internet access policy has been framed mostly from a technologically 
deterministic perspective of a linear trajectory from access to the internet, to ICT-
skills training geared first to employment and, ultimately, to socio-economic 
inclusion. Integral to the early digital divide policies was the establishment of so-
called public access points (Xavier 1997; Lentz, et al. 2000). In line with the 
determinist positions of policymakers, public access points were positioned in public 
spaces, such as employment or welfare benefit offices, and public libraries, allowing 
those on the wrong side of the divide to be reached easily (European Commission 
2001, 18). However, studies have shown that social exclusion is a complex 
phenomenon and that access to an information and communication infrastructure is 
by no means the miracle solution to social inclusion and social cohesion (Norris 
2001; Mansell 2002; Cammaerts, et al. 2003). 
 
Today, public access to the internet increasingly is being provided by both municipal 
and private actors through public Wi-Fi services. Municipalities often legitimate state 
sponsored public provision as essential to attract tourists, stimulate the local 
business sector and/or cater to a young and media savvy urban population (Bar and 
Park 2006; Forlano 2008; Josgrilberg 2008). In the private sector, there is a 
multiplicity of commercial spaces providing free public wireless access, from brands 
such as Starbucks and McDonalds, to small local cafés, bars and bookshops (Forlano 
2008; Hartmann 2009). This invites strategies of resistance by so-called ‘wireless 
squatters’, and encourages those providing the wireless access to make its users buy 
something (Hampton and Gupta 2008). 
 
As Barranca’s (2004) Gramscian triad of commercial wireless broadband (market), 
municipal wireless broadband (state) and community broadband networks (civil 
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society) implies, a third, community-based approach to providing access through Wi-
Fi networks, has emerged, and is the focus of this part of the discussion. Community 
wireless networks, unlike municipal and commercial wireless networks, are bottom-
up, grassroots initiatives providing Wi-Fi access. As Table 1 shows, there are some 
major differences within the community wireless sector, and various degrees of 
appropriation are apparent.  
 
 
Table 1: Different models of community wireless networks 
 
Type: Characteristics: Example: 
Individual Wireless 
Providers 
Consciously or unconsciously 
leaving your network 
unsecured, decentralized 
- 
Radical Wireless 
Networks 
non commercial, copyleft, 
peer2peer culture, no 
intermediaries, decentralized 
http://www.reseaucitoyen.be
/ - Brussels (Belgium) 
Community Owned 
Wireless Networks 
not for profit, organizationally 
structured, also hold a lobby 
function for open internet, 
often centralized 
http://www.nycwireless.net/  
- New York (US) 
Privately Sponsored 
Community Wireless 
Networks 
not for profit, but yes to private 
sponsorship, often centralized 
http://wirelessantwerpen.be/ 
- Antwerp (Belgium) 
Privately Owned 
Community Wireless 
Networks 
commercial models with social 
gain aims and outcomes  
http://www.southwitham.net
/6.html South Witham 
Broadband Ltd. (UK) 
 
First, some people deliberately leave their wireless connection unsecured, enabling 
the very local community – immediate neighbors – to access the internet for free. 
Others might leave their connection unsecured due to a of lack of technical skills or 
knowledge that it can be secured. The net result is that a considerable number of 
people can access the internet through the unsecured Wi-Fi broadband connections 
of others.  
 
While more organized, radical Wi-Fi networks are also highly decentralized, and aim 
to weave together a tapestry of individuals that can share part of these private 
broadband connections through an open source protocol, thus providing more 
protection to those who share their access. An interesting example of such a radical 
Wi-Fi project is Réseau Citoyen in Brussels (see Carpentier 2008). It was launched in 
2000 and its website says: 
 
We consider that equality between citizens is important and therefore some technical 
choices are excluded as they would imply that some systems would have to play a 
preeminent role. Each citizen is represented by a router, and no router should be able 
to control others. […] We exclusively evolve in the non-commercial world. The 
commercial world may be our neighbour, sometimes our partner but never our 
master.4 
 
Hartmann (2009, 432) considers a similar case in Germany, the Freifunk network, 
which aims to foster ‘a democratization of communication media and better local 
social networks through the sharing of Wi-Fi resources that further the development 
of more open networks’. This latter aspect – an allegiance to open source and open 
internet – is crucial to radical Wi-Fi networks. 
 
Community owned wireless networks are even more structured organizationally, and 
at times also function as (local) lobby organizations; they are often inextricably 
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embedded in and/or connected to the local civil society ecology. They are ‘examples 
of the way in which the community form of organizing can be applied in the area of 
telecommunications infrastructure albeit on a relatively small scale’ (Forlano 2008, 
3). New York Wireless is a typical case of a localized community-based wireless 
network that aims to ‘work with public and other nonprofit organizations to bring 
broadband wireless Internet to under-served communities’ and also sees itself as an 
‘advocacy group for wireless community networking’5. There exist a variety of ways in 
which access is provided, depending on local circumstances. Community-based Wi-Fi 
projects are often connected to similar initiatives across the globe through 
transnational networks, enabling the sharing of knowledge, open source software and 
different models for providing local access6. 
  
Privately sponsored community wireless networks are proud of their not-for-profit 
ethic in providing access to the internet, but associate themselves with the private 
sector in the form of direct partnerships, or through sponsorship and advertising. 
Privately sponsored community wireless networks favour linear connections between 
powerful nodes above the more anarchist tapestry of connections enabling radical 
and parts of the community owned models. The case of WirelessAntwerpen, 
described by Carpentier (2008) which recently became WirelessBelgië, is a good 
example of such a not-for-profit organization that is (partially) sponsored by the 
private sector. WirelessBelgië is an expert-led collective, consisting of a core group of 
enthusiastic radio amateurs and engineers providing free wireless access in cities 
through its own centralized network of powerful high-tech antennae and 
transmitters. It also negotiates access to high-rise buildings, with property owners, 
which are described as  sponsors and which receive sponsorship in the form of 
hardware.  
 
Finally, there are cases of private companies active within the community wireless 
access movement. In the UK in particular, this type of privately owned community 
wireless project is quite common in rural communities. South Witham Broadband 
Ltd describes itself as a local social enterprise serving the local community. The 
company was founded in 2004 and provides wireless and broadband internet access 
to the South Witham area, which is between Leicester and Peterborough.  
 
The gift economy in relation to sharing access implicates reciprocity in various ways. 
The most apparent expectation of reciprocity is observed in commercial spaces, but 
also the motivations of local authorities for investment in free Wi-Fi access spots are 
often economic rather than altruistic. Some forms of community WI-FI are altruistic 
in nature, and aimed at sharing access with no expectation of reciprocity. In the case 
of individual sharers this is often unintentional. The service offers of radical and 
community projects are altruistic, but this generosity is often difficult to sustain. The 
lack of reciprocity means users often do not identify themselves with a community 
project, which is obliged to compete for frequencies and users, with more powerful 
commercial and municipal networks (Sandvin 2004; Carpentier 2008). Note that 
although many community Wi-Fi initiatives were born out of frustration at the lack of 
commercial or public alternatives (Forlano 2008), this frustration has also been used 
by some social entrepreneurs to appropriate the discourse of community WI-FI and 
provide subscription services to underserved local communities.  
 
It must be remembered that frequencies – crucial to Wi-Fi technology – are assets, 
potentially subject to leasing through a licensing regime controlled by the state. It 
remains to be seen to what extent unlicensed community Wi-Fi networks will be 
allowed to operate in the future. Likewise, leaving one’s broadband connection 
unsecured enabling neighbors to access the internet, also a form of sharing access, 
might have serious consequences in the near future. In the UK, one of the main 
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objectives of the Digital Economy Act (BIS/DCMS 2010) is to safeguard the rights of 
copyright holders, which facilitates repression of the participatory sharing culture 
and might have the negative effect of closing down community Wi-Fi initiatives, and 
scare individuals who share their broadband access with others around them, into 
securing their connection to avoid being held liable for copyright protected content 
downloaded by others using their connection or network. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In the three modes of sharing considered above, various ways of giving, receiving, 
sharing and taking can be observed. Also, sharing in digital environments does not 
rule out reciprocity, and altruism is by no means the only motive for sharing. Finally, 
all forms of sharing attract the imposition of various co-option and appropriation 
strategies, by capitalist agendas (cf. Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Overview of the three case studies 
 
What is 
Shared? 
Disruption? Reciprocity? Co-option strategies? 
(1) Code  Propriety 
software 
industry 
• Intellectual 
property 
• Legal framework 
• Social capital and 
reputation 
• Career 
opportunities 
• Open Source vs. 
Public Licenses  
• Embedding of 
propriety code 
• Indirect auxiliary 
models 
• Remuneration 
(2) Digital 
Content: 
Publishing and 
entertainment 
industry 
• Enforced 
reciprocity 
• Online 
advertising 
• Kudos for 
bloggers 
• Legal downloading 
• Premium services of 
filesharing sites 
• Artists/labels 
appropriating web 
2.0 
(3) Access ISPs and the 
Telecom 
industry 
• Buying 
something 
• Promoting a city 
• Advertising and 
sponsorship 
• Commercial and 
Municipal Public 
Access WI-FI 
• Bandwidth 
• Appropriation of 
Community WI-FI 
 
In terms of sharing code, the gift is always conditional, depending on the type of 
license. The GPL retains intellectual property, but subverts copyright law to keep the 
gift in the public domain, while some open source licenses enable the gift to be 
passed on to someone who ultimately will use it to generate added value. Sharing 
code invokes some reciprocity in terms of reputation, social and symbolic capital or 
the careers of coders.  
 
Sharing digital content can be examined at two levels both involving distinct 
dynamics. First, peer-to-peer sharing between anonymous users operating through 
the strength of weak ties, can be seen as a form of embedded or enforced reciprocity; 
if you take, you automatically give as well. Second, another level of sharing digital 
content takes place through blogs and commercial filesharing sites. Here reciprocity 
emerges in the form of premium services to download more, and more quickly, or in 
the form of intrusive advertising. At the same time, bloggers often crave and receive 
kudos or positive feedback from other bloggers and/or anonymous downloaders.  
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Sharing access to the internet through Wi-Fi networks in cafés or bookstores is a gift 
with a clear expectation of reciprocity. Likewise, the motives of municipalities in 
providing Wi-Fi access are seldom expressed in terms of public goods. Many 
community Wi-Fi projects and individuals share their access altruistically, but here 
too a gradual co-option by commercial interests can be observed. To some extent this 
is inevitable since ultimately the costs of bandwidth and of infrastructure updates to 
provide the citizen or consumer with ‘free’ Wi-Fi access, has to be paid for by 
someone. This and the lack of identification of users with community projects 
seriously affects the sustainability of community Wi-Fi initiatives.  
 
It is paradoxical that a fragmented individualism produced through the ideology of 
neoliberalism in combination with an anarchistic collectivism, drives the most 
disruptive forms of sharing – decentralized software development, anonymous 
filesharing and individual as well as radical Wi-Fi networks. Through these disruptive 
practices, altruism as well as reciprocity often become embroiled with individualism 
or even egoistic motives. What this points to is the complex relationship between the 
capitalist commodity exchange regime and its disruptions, between sharing, giving 
and exchanging. The rejection of the commodity exchange model by sharing practices 
in the digital context, however, is not necessarily ideological or negating 
neoliberalism since it often does not have a finite purpose, i.e. the destruction of 
capitalism. Code might be shared to further one’s career as a programmer, a track 
might be downloaded because it is easy and cheap to do so, and access might be 
shared because of the lack of knowledge about how to secure a Wi-Fi network.  
 
The above analysis shows that, over time, these disruptive sharing practices become 
(partially) enmeshed with capitalist logics aimed at creating added value through the 
disruption. As a result, some forms of sharing cease to be disruptive; in other cases 
the practices of rejection themselves become sources of commercial exploitations by 
indirectly providing revenue. So, a traditional form of capitalism clings on to the 
hegemony of the copyright/property regime, but more radical capitalist strategies 
appropriate the sharing culture in different ways. In some cases, this is not 
necessarily bad. The massive support of the FLOSS movement by (some) corporate 
interests has contributed greatly to its success. Commercial filesharing sites enable 
bloggers and aggregators to share large files with multiple others and to stream live 
television. South Witham Broadband Ltd in the UK, through a form of social 
entrepreneurship, provides better quality access and a dedicated service to remote 
local communities where the larger operators have not invested enough and service is 
poor.  
 
While the sharing practices discussed here might not all aim to disrupt capitalism, 
pervert the property regime or reject the primacy of the market, to varying degrees 
these are often the end results. Certainly, in terms of the sharing of digital content the 
disruption is considerable, based on the scale at which it takes place and the wide 
diversity of the content that is made freely available. This leaves some important 
choices. The cultural exchange model and the participatory culture in which it is 
situated induces important societal benefits – externalities – which are difficult to 
measure in economic or quantitative terms, but are very real at the everyday level, for 
many citizens, in terms of the software they use, the culture they can enjoy and/or 
their access to the internet. Despite these gains, governments and parts of the 
entertainment industry are gearing up to confront this participatory culture head on 
by attempting to legally coerce it firmly back into the commodity exchange model.  
 
However, in line with Adorno’s words, quoted at the start of this piece, the history of 
digital resistance is such that new ways undoubtedly will be developed to counter 
efforts to close down participatory cultures based on cultural exchange models and to 
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escape the material exchange value. But as the above analysis shows, other forms of 
reciprocity apply in most digital participatory practices based on sharing and, 
furthermore, digital sharing practices do not inherently constitute an intentional act 
of resistance against neoliberalism’s core-premises, they are to some extent a product 
of it.  
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Notes:                                                         
1 Other forms of potentially disruptive sharing not addressed in this paper include wikis and 
citizen journalism. 
2 Digital revenues grew to 3.7 Billion US$ in 2008, accounting for almost 20% of total 
recorded music sales (IFPI 2009. 6). 
3 See: http://www.planetterrorrecords.com/  
4 Source see: http://www.reseaucitoyen.be/wiki/index.php/Welcome  
5 Source see: http://www.nycwireless.net/about/mission  
6 The World Summit for Free Information Infrastructures held in London in 2005 and the 
International Community Wireless Network Summit held in the US (Columbia) in 2007 are 
illustrative of this (see Forlano 2008).  
